

CIA/OCI/BRIEF 190-75
10 DECEMBER 1975

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EAST ASIA BRIEF 190-75-4

1. CHINA-VIETNAM: PEKING'S SENSITIVITY OVER THE SECURITY OF ITS SOUTHEAST FLANK, AS WELL AS ITS INCREASING IMPATIENCE WITH HANOI, WAS VIVIDLY ILLUSTRATED LATE LAST MONTH IN A SHARP PEOPLE'S DAILY ATTACK ON "FOREIGN AGGRESSORS" IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.⁴

THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER TWO MAJOR ISLAND GROUPINGS IN THE AREA--THE SPRATLAYS AND THE PARACELS--HAS BEEN A MAJOR ANNOYANCE IN SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS SINCE THE CHINESE TOOK THE PARACELS FROM THE FORMER SAIGON GOVERNMENT IN JANUARY 1974.

BOTH PEKING AND HANOI HAVE PERIODICALLY REITERATED THEIR CLAIMS TO BOTH ISLAND GROUPS, BUT NEITHER SIDE HAD OPENLY PUSHED THE ISSUE IN PUBLIC. THE CHINESE EVEN DECLINED TO RESPOND TO HANOI'S ANNOUNCEMENT LAST MAY THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES HAD CAPTURED SEVERAL OF THE SPRATLAYS--500 MILES SOUTH OF THE PARACELS--FROM THE FORMER SOUTH VIETNAM GOVERNMENT.⁴

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IN SEPTEMBER, THE CHINESE TURNED UP THE HEAT ON THE ISLANDS ISSUE JUST PRIOR TO NORTH VIETNAM PARTY CHIEF LE DUAN'S VISIT TO PEKING; THEY PUBLICLY REITERATED THEIR CLAIMS TO THE DISPUTED ISLANDS AND RECALLED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MONTHS THE 1974 TAKE-OVER IN THE PARACELS.⁴

LAST MONTH'S BROADSIDE WAS BY FAR THE TOUGHEST CHINESE STATEMENT ON THE DISPUTE SINCE EARLY 1974. IT AMOUNTS TO THE FIRST DIRECT CHALLENGE OF HANOI'S CLAIMS TO THE ISLANDS AND EMPHASIZES THE SERIOUSNESS OF PEKING'S DETERMINATION TO REGAIN ALL CONTESTED ISLANDS. THE ARTICLE ASSERTED THAT CHINA'S CLAIMS DATE BACK 2,000 YEARS AND CITED ARCHEOLOGICAL AND OTHER EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CLAIMS. CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL THE ISLANDS WAS DESCRIBED AS BOTH "SACRED" AND "INALIENABLE." PEKING'S DEMAND THAT ALL THE DISPUTED ISLANDS MUST BE RETURNED TO CHINESE CONTROL WAS JUXTAPOSED WITH ITS LONG-HELD

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PLEDGE TO "LIBERATE" TAIWAN, A CLEAR INDICATION NOT ONLY OF THE IMPORTANCE THE CHINESE ATTACH TO THEIR CLAIMS, BUT ALSO A SIGN THAT PEKING MAY BE PREPARED TO WAIT SOME TIME FOR A FINAL SOLUTION OF THE ISSUE --AS IT IS IN THE CASE OF TAIWAN.⁴

IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO AVOID ANY CONFUSION ABOUT THE PRIMARY TARGET OF PEKING'S BLAST, THE ARTICLE EMPLOYED LANGUAGE THAT PLAYED DOWN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CLAIMS OTHER PARTIES HAVE TO THE SPRATLY ISLANDS. THE NATIONALIST CHINESE CLAIM ALL OF THE ISLANDS AND MAINTAIN A MILITARY GARRISON ON ONE, BUT THE PEOPLE'S DAILY REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT MANY OF THE ISLANDS ARE STILL NOT "IN CHINESE HANDS" RULES OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT PEKING WAS REFERRING TO THE NATIONALIST PRESENCE THERE. PEKING IS DOUBTLESSLY CONFIDENT THAT NATIONALIST CLAIMS WILL BE RESOLVED WHEN THE MUCH LARGER TAIWAN QUESTION IS SETTLED.⁴

THE PHILIPPINES ALSO CLAIM SOME OF THE ISLANDS

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IN THE SPRATLY GROUP. PEKING HAS NEVER MADE AN ISSUE OF MANILA'S CLAIMS, HOWEVER, AND, WHEN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE ESTABLISHED EARLIER THIS YEAR, BOTH SIDES AGREED TO SETTLE ALL BILATERAL DISPUTES WITHOUT RESORT TO FORCE. PEKING SEEMS PREPARED TO PUT ASIDE THE DISAGREEMENT WITH MANILA.⁴

ALTHOUGH PEOPLE'S DAILY LEFT NO DOUBT THAT HANOI WAS THE MAJOR OBJECT OF ITS WRATH, ITS ATTACK ON HANOI WAS IMPLICIT: REFERENCES TO MOSCOW IN THE BLAST WERE EXPLICIT AND VITUPERATIVE, LEAVING NO QUESTION THAT PEKING BELIEVES THE VIETNAMESE ARE ABETTING THE SOVIETS IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXPAND RUSSIAN INFLUENCE INTO THE REGION. SIGNIFICANTLY THE ARTICLE WAS PUBLISHED ONLY TWO DAYS AFTER LE DUAN RETURNED TO HANOI FROM MOSCOW--WHERE HE RECEIVED A MUCH WARMER WELCOME THAN HE HAD IN PEKING, GAINED A SOVIET AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC AID TO NORTH VIETNAM, AND SECONDED MOSCOW'S VIEWS ON DETENTE AND ON INTERNA-

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TIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. PEKING INSISTS THAT BOTH DETENTE AND THE RECENT HELSINKI SECURITY PACT ARE SOVIET "TRICKS" DESIGNED TO FACILITATE WHAT THE CHINESE SEE AS SOVIET "EXPANSIONISM." LE DUAN'S ENDORSEMENT OF DETENTE PUTS HANOI SQUARELY IN MOSCOW'S CAMP ON AN ISSUE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO THE CHINESE AND WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY READ IN PEKING AS A DELIBERATE PROVOCATION.⁴

IN FACT, THE TREATMENT LE DUAN RECEIVED IN PEKING LAST SEPTEMBER CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH THE ROUSING WELCOME HE GOT IN MOSCOW. THERE WAS NO JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO MARK HIS CHINA VISIT, AND THE HANOI LEADER FAILED TO TENDER THE NORMAL FAREWELL BANQUET PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR HOME.⁴

THE CHINESE CLEARLY SEE A CORRELATION BETWEEN HANOI'S INCREASING TILT TOWARD MOSCOW AND THE LONG-RANGE POSSIBILITIES FOR SOVIET "MEDDLING" THROUGH VIETNAM IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AS WELL AS SOUTHEAST

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ASIA GENERALLY. IT ALSO IS APPARENT THAT THE CHINESE CONSIDER CONTROL OF ISLANDS IN THE AREA VITALLY IMPORTANT TO THEIR SECURITY. THE PEOPLE'S DAILY ARTICLE, IN FACT, REFERS TO THE REGION AS "AN IMPORTANT GATE OF CHINA" AND TO THE ISLANDS AS LOCATED ON MAJOR SHIPPING LANES.

FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN SHARPLY CRITICAL OF THE CHINESE SEIZURE OF THE PARACELS. SINCE EARLY 1974, MOSCOW HAS ROUTINELY ATTACKED CHINA'S CLAIMS TO ALL OF THE ISLANDS AND ITS USE OF FORCE IN THE PARACELS. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, HAVE STOPPED SHORT OF PROVIDING OUTRIGHT SUPPORT TO HANOI'S COUNTERCLAIMS. SOVIET MAPS STILL SHOW THE ISLANDS AS BELONGING TO CHINA, ALTHOUGH RECENT PRESS COMMENTS HAVE IMPLIED THAT THEY WERE VIETNAMESE. PEKING IGNORED THESE ATTACKS UNTIL LAST WEEK. THEN, THE PEOPLE'S DAILY ARTICLE ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION, THROWING ASIDE EARLIER SUPPORT FOR CHINA'S

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CLAIMS, MOUNTED A "VENOMOUS" ASSAULT ON PEKING
 AFTER THE PARACELS INCIDENT. 4

PEKING'S LONG-TERM CONCERNS ALMOST CERTAINLY
 HINGE ON ITS VIEW OF SOVIET INTENTIONS AND ACTIVITIES.
 CHINESE LEADERS ALSO SEEM PERSUADED, HOWEVER, THAT
 IN THE SHORTER RUN HANOI COULD UNILATERALLY DISRUPT
 THEIR HOPES OF DEVELOPING A BLOC OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES
 ALONG CHINA'S SOUTHERN BORDER. THE CHINESE AND VIET-
 NAMESE SHARE VERY FEW COMMON PERCEPTIONS OF SOUTHEAST
 ASIA. THEY ARE CLEARLY ON OPPOSITE SIDES IN THE CUR-
 RENT DISPUTE BETWEEN THAILAND AND LAOS. HANOI HAS
 VIGOROUSLY DEFENDED THE LAO SIDE AND HAS LAUNCHED
 FREQUENT ATTACKS ON THAI "AGGRESSION." PEKING, ON
 THE OTHER HAND, HAS REMAINED RELATIVELY QUIET ON THE
 SUBJECT, PRIVATELY LOBBYING FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION
 TO THE DISAGREEMENT AND ENCOURAGING IMPROVED RELATIONS
 BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN BY
 FAR THE LARGEST CONTRIBUTORS TO CAMBODIAN RECONSTRUC-

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TION SINCE THE COMMUNISTS TOOK OVER THERE LAST SPRING.
 PEKING HAS ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS ON CAMBODIA'S
 SIDE IN HE BORDER DISPUTEWITH NORTH VIETNAM AND AP-
 PARENTLY ENCOURAGED THE CAMBODIAN COMMUNISTS TO OPEN
 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THAILAND. (SECRET)Y

2. CHINA: TWO TOP LEADERS HAVE RECENTLY REAPPEARED AFTER
 SIGNIFICANT ABSENCES. CHIANG CHING WAS PRESENT ON
 DECEMBER 1 AT THE MEETING AND PICTURE TAKING SESSION
 BETWEEN PRESIDENT FORD AND CHINESE HEAD OF STATE CHU
 TE. HER LAST APPEARANCE WAS ON OCTOBER 15 AT THE
 CLOSING SESSION OF THE NATIONAL TACHAI CONFERENCE IN
 PEKING. CHIANG'S POLITICAL POWER HAS BEEN SHARPLY
 DIMINISHED THIS YEAR, AND HER APPEARANCES NOW SEEM TO
 BE UNDER THE CONTROL OF REGIME MODERATES AND DESIGNED
 TO PROMOTE AN IMAGE OF UNITY. IN THE PAST, MADAME
 MAO TENDED TO PUNCTUATE PERIODS OF NONAPPEARANCES
 WITH PUBLIC ACTIVITIES THAT WERE DESIGNED TO RAISE
 RATHER THAN LOWER POLITICAL TENSIONS. HER ASSOCIATION

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WITH THE TACHAI MEETING WAS OBVIOUSLY MEANT TO PRESENT A UNITED FRONT FOR THIS MAJOR UNDERTAKING. HER PRESENCE AT THE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FORD IS DESIGNED TO CONVEY THE SAME MESSAGE--THE SUPPORT OF THE POLITICAL LEFT FOR SINO-US RELATIONS.4

THE OTHER REAPPEARANCE WAS DEFENSE MINISTER YEH CHIEN-YING, WHO HEADED THE CHINESE REPRESENTATION AT THE PEKING CELEBRATIONS OF ALBANIAN NATIONAL DAY ON NOVEMBER 29. YEH HAD NOT APPEARED SINCE OCTOBER 25 AND IS WIDELY RUMORED TO BE ILL. SURPRISINGLY, YEH DID NOT SEE PRESIDENT FORD EVEN THOUGH HE PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN PAST MEETINGS WITH RANKING US OFFICIALS. YEH'S PLACE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY ANOTHER CHOU EN-LAI STALWART, VICE PREMIER AND LEADING ECONOMIC SPECIALIST LI HSIEN-NIEN. {CONFIDENTIAL}

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 370-75.4

PARAGUAY: PARAGUAY, IN ITS BUFFER POSITION BETWEEN THE LARGE COUNTRIES OF ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL, HAS IN THE PAST GENERALLY DISPENSED SEPARATE BUT MORE OR LESS EQUAL TREATMENT. IT HAS NOT NECESSARILY BEEN TRYING TO PLAY ONE BIG POWER OFF AGAINST THE OTHER BUT HAS BEEN TRYING TO GARNER THE ADVANTAGES FROM EACH RELATIONSHIP WITHOUT ALLOWING EITHER LARGER COUNTRY TO DOMINATE PARAGUAYAN AFFAIRS. TRADITIONALLY, THE PARAGUAYANS HAVE IDENTIFIED CULTURALLY WITH THE ARGENTINES. THE GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, VIEWS THE GOVERNMENT OF ISABEL PERON AS UNSTABLE, IS CONCERNED ABOUT A POSSIBLE TURN TOWARD THE LEFT BY ARGENTINA, AND IS NOW INDICATING A MARKED TILT IN THE DIRECTION OF BRAZIL, WHICH PARAGUAY VIEWS AS A FUTURE WORLD POWER WHOSE ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA COULD ASSIST PARAGUAYAN DEVELOPMENT.4

THIS TILT WAS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT DURING THE VISIT TO PARAGUAY BY BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT GEISEL IN EARLY DECEMBER. POMP AND CEREMONY ATTENDED THE FIRST VISIT OF A BRAZILIAN CHIEF OF STATE IN 35 YEARS, AND THE GOVERNMENT DECLARED A THREE-DAY HOLIDAY FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES.

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PREPARATIONS INCLUDED A CRACKDOWN ON COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS AND SUBVERSIVES, WITH THE NUMBER OF ARRESTS RUMORED AS HIGH AS 400 ALTHOUGH OFFICIAL RECORDS ACKNOWLEDGED ONLY ABOUT ONE-TENTH AS MANY.⁴

PRESIDENT GEISEL RECEIVED THE HIGHEST DECORATION PARAGUAY BESTOWS ON A FOREIGN OFFICIAL, AND HE RETURNED A PRICELESS GOLD BOOK CAPTURED BY THE BRAZILIANS IN THE WAR OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE SOME 100 YEARS AGO. MORE CONCRETE ACCOMPLISHMENTS INCLUDED THE SETTLEMENT OF A BOUNDARY DISPUTE, THE GRANTING TO PARAGUAY OF \$3.5 BILLION IN CREDITS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE ITAIPU HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT, AND THE SIGNING OF A NEW TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION CALLING FOR EXTENSIVE BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PARAGUAYAN DEVELOPMENT.⁴

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[REDACTED]

PROJECT. BRAZIL WANTS TO DRAW PARAGUAY CLOSER INTO ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE BUT IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT REACTION FROM ARGENTINA AND FROM BOLIVIA AS WELL. ALTHOUGH BOTH COUNTRIES HOPE TO AVOID NEEDLESS

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OFFENSE WITH THEIR NEW TREATY. THEY ARE NOT AT ALL SURE THIS IS
POSSIBLE. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET.H

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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 190-75.4

1. LEBANON: RADICAL MUSLIM FORCES HAVE GAINED CONTROL OF SOME PREVIOUSLY CONTESTED GROUND DURING THE HEAVY FIGHTING IN BEIRUT THIS WEEK. 4

THE CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM COMBATANTS AND THE LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES SEEK CONTROL OF KEY HOTELS TO GAIN A COMMANDING FIELD OF FIRE OVER DISPUTED TERRITORY IN ADJOINING NEIGHBORHOODS. THE LEFTISTS, WHO OCCUPIED THE ST. GEORGES HOTEL ON MONDAY, LATE ON TUESDAY WERE VYING WITH ARMY TROOPS FOR CONTROL OF THE PHOENICIA HOTEL. 4

RIGHT-WING PHALANGIST MILITIAMEN EVACUATED THE PHOENICIA DURING A BRIEF LOCAL TRUCE. THEY SUFFERED HEAVIER CASUALTIES THAN THEIR MUSLIM OPPONENTS, WHO APPARENTLY HAD MOVED IN HEAVIER WEAPONS, INCLUDING ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS SUPPLIED BY THE FEDAYEEN. THE PHALANGISTS, WHO CLAIMED LAST NIGHT TO HAVE MADE GAINS IN OTHER AREAS, ARE HOLDING OUT ALONG A FRONT THAT EXTENDS FROM THE HOTEL DISTRICT TO BEIRUT PORT. THEY USE THIS CORRIDOR TO SUPPLY THEIR FORCES IN THE HOTEL DISTRICT FROM MORE SECURE PHALANGIST

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STRONGHOLDS SOUTH OF THE PORT.4

THE LEFTIST FORCES ARE LED BY IBRAHIM QULAYLAT, A RADICAL LEBANESE MUSLIM BACKED BY LIBYA AND SOME PALESTINIAN FEDAYEEN GROUPS. HIS INDEPENDENT NASSERITE MOVEMENT HAS SOME 400-500 MILITIAMEN AND CAN DRAW ON SUBSTANTIAL BACKING FROM REJECTIONIST PALESTINIANS, RADICALS WITHIN THE MAJOR FEDAYEEN GROUPS, AND LEBANESE COMMUNISTS. QULAYLAT REPEATED CHARGES ON TUESDAY THAT LEBANESE ARMY TROOPS WERE FIRING ON MUSLIM FORCES, AND SAID HIS FOLLOWERS WOULD RETALIATE. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS FROM BEIRUT, SEVERAL ARMY VEHICLES WERE FIRED ON BY MUSLIM AND PALESTINIAN FORCES, AND AT LEAST TWO ARMY COMMANDOS WERE KILLED.4

LEBANON'S POLITICAL LEADERS SO FAR HAVE COME UP WITH NO STRATEGY FOR ENDING THE RENEWED FIGHTING. THE BEST HOPE IS THAT THE LEFTISTS--WHO ARE CLAIMING VICTORY--WILL CONVINCE THEMSELVES THAT THEIR LIMITED MILITARY GAINS CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT REVENGE FOR THE MURDER OF NUMEROUS MUSLIMS BY PHALANGISTS LAST WEEKEND. THE ID AL-ADHA MUSLIM HOLIDAY THAT STARTS LATE THIS WEEK MAY

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PROVIDE AN EXCUSE FOR BOTH SIDES TO STOP THE FIGHTING. {SECRET}

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EUROPEAN BRIEF 190-75.4

1. USSR: GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AT THE POLISH PARTY CONGRESS ON TUESDAY WAS SHORT ON SUBSTANCE, BUT REPEATED RECENT CRITICISM OF THE WEST.⁴

AS WAS APPROPRIATE TO THE OCCASION, BREZHNEV DEVOTED OVER HALF OF THE SPEECH TO TALKING ABOUT THE STEPS TAKEN TOWARD CLOSER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN POLAND AND THE USSR, AND, MORE GENERALLY, ABOUT THE BENEFICENCE OF THE COMMUNIST COMMUNITY. HE REFERRED TO THE NORMS OF "SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM"—WORDS THAT IN YUGOSLAVIA AND ROMANIA TRANSLATE TO SOVIET HEGEMONISM—BUT HE QUICKLY FOLLOWED WITH A SENTENCE ALLUDING TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATES THAT MAKE UP THE COMMUNIST COMMUNITY.⁴

IN COMMENTING ON RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, CSCE WAS CLEARLY ON BREZHNEV'S MIND, PERHAPS BECAUSE THE POLISH PARTY CONGRESS OFFERED AN APPROPRIATE VENUE FOR REPEATING A FEW "TRUTHS" ABOUT THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT. HIS DEMAND THAT NO SINGLE ASPECT OF THE AGREEMENT BE EMPHASIZED OVER ANOTHER AND HIS CRITICISM OF

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THE WEST FOR ITS ALLEGED FAILURE TO DISSEMINATE THE TEXT SUFFICIENTLY HAVE BEEN SAID BEFORE; SO, TOO, HAS HIS REFERENCE TO "IDEOLOGICAL PENETRATION" BY THE WEST. HE MADE EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO THE FOLLOW-UP CSCE SESSION IN BELGRADE IN 1977 AND SPOKE FAVORABLY OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ORGANIZING EUROPEAN CONGRESSES TO ADDRESS SUCH PROBLEMS AS THE ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS. THIS CLEARLY WAS MEANT AS A TRIAL BALLOON, AND MORE WILL PROBABLY BE HEARD FROM MOSCOW ON THIS MATTER.4

BREZHNEV'S SPEECH, AS IS OFTEN THE CASE, IS AS INTERESTING FOR WHAT HE CHOSE NOT TO SAY AS FOR WHAT HE ACTUALLY SAID. THERE WAS NO REJOINDER, IMPLICIT OR EXPLICIT, TO CRITICISM REGARDING SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN ANGOLA. HE MADE NO MENTION OF A COMMUNIST DUTY TO SUPPORT LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, NOR DID HE REFER TO THE INEVITABILITY OF CONTINUED IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE. HE DID REPEAT THE FAMILIAR FORMULATION ON MOVING AHEAD WITH DETENTE DESPITE THE EFFORTS OF WESTERN CRITICS, BUT HE DID NOT SAY ANYTHING EXPLICIT ABOUT SALT.4

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BREZHNEV'S REMARKS ATTACKING "SOME INFLUENTIAL CIRCLES IN THE WEST" FOR THEIR CAMPAIGN OF "DISINFORMATION AND SLANDER" AGAINST THE COMMUNIST CAMP ARE AMONG HIS MOST INTEMPERATE IN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

2. YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: THE YUGOSLAV MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND OF FOREIGN TRADE ARE IN MOSCOW TO SIGN A LONG-RANGE ECONOMIC AGREEMENT AND TO MAKE A FIRST-HAND ASSESSMENT OF PRE-CONGRESS POLITICS IN THE SOVIET CAPITAL.4

THE CONCLUSION OF A FIVE YEAR TRADE AGREEMENT FOR 1976-80 WILL PROBABLY BE THE PUBLIC HIGHLIGHT OF THE VISIT.4

ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, FOREIGN MINISTER MINIC'S TALKS--POSSIBLY THE FINAL ONES AT THIS LEVEL BEFORE THE CPSU CONGRESS MEETS IN FEBRUARY--PROMISE TO BE LESS REWARDING. BELGRADE CLEARLY IS NOT SATISFIED WITH RECENT SOVIET DENIALS OF INVOLVEMENT WITH COMINFORMIST SUBVERSIVES. THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE ALSO DEADLOCKED OVER CONFLICTING GOALS IN THE LONG-

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POSTPONED MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES.⁴

BELGRADE AND MOSCOW BOTH SUPPORT THE MPLA IN ANGOLA, BUT THEIR STANDS ON THE LAST SINAI ACCORDS ARE IN CONFLICT AND COULD CAUSE TROUBLE. SIMILARLY, MINIC COULD FACE SOVIET displeasure over the YUGOSLAV PREMIER'S PRECEDENT-SETTING VISIT TO CHINA THIS FALL.⁴

YUGOSLAV MEDIA ARE PLAYING SEVERAL TUNES ON THE MINIC VISIT. FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE WEST, THE PRESS IS INSISTING THAT RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ARE MORE OR LESS NORMAL--AND THUS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO THIRD PARTY MANIPULATION. A COMMENTARY BROADCAST TO MOSCOW LAST WEEK, HOWEVER, REASSERTED BELGRADE'S NONALIGNED PRINCIPLES, INCLUDING ITS CONTINUING STRUGGLE AGAINST "HEGEMONY" BY EITHER BLOC. (CONFIDENTIAL)⁴

3. BULGARIA-YUGOSLAVIA: SOFIA HAS REPORTEDLY MADE A FORMAL PROTEST TO BELGRADE ABOUT YUGOSLAV PROPAGANDA CLAIMS THAT

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BULGARIA HAS USED TERRORISM TO SUPPRESS ITS MACEDONIANS.

DESPITE THE PROTEST, YUGOSLAV MEDIA ARE AGAIN STEPPING UP THE PACE OF ANTI-BULGARIAN COMMENTARY.⁴

ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR IN SOFIA WAS SUMMONED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY LAST MONTH TO RECEIVE THE PROTEST. THE BULGARIANS REPORTEDLY DECRIED ALLEGATIONS THAT SOFIA HAD ARRESTED NUMEROUS MACEDONIANS AND HAD DEPORTED THEM TO CAMPS IN THE NORTH. NEITHER SIDE HAS PUBLICLY REFERRED TO THE PROTEST.⁴

THE YUGOSLAV MEDIA HAVE NEVERTHELESS CONTINUED TO REPEAT AND EVEN EMBELLISH THESE SAME ALLEGATIONS IN THE WAKE OF THE BULGARIAN CENSUS LAST WEEK. THE LATEST COMMENTARY FLATLY STATES THERE WAS NO CATEGORY FOR MACEDONIANS, AND NOTES THE SURVEY ONLY SERVED SOFIA'S POLITICAL PURPOSES BY PROCLAIMING THAT MACEDONIANS ARE ETHNIC BULGARIANS.⁴

THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LONG-STANDING

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DISPUTE SHATTER THE CLIMATE OF UNEASY CALM THAT LASTED BARELY TWO WEEKS AFTER BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MLADENOV VISITED BELGRADE LAST MONTH. MLADENOV AND HIS YUGOSLAV COUNTERPART, MILOS MINIC, REPORTEDLY DISCUSSED THE ISSUE OF BELGRADE'S INFLAMMATORY POLEMICS, BUT WERE UNABLE TO AGREE ON MUZZLING BELGRADE'S OUTSPOKEN NATIONALISTS. [CONFIDENTIAL]

4. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE HUSAK REGIME HAS IN RECENT WEEKS BEEN PAYING LIP-SERVICE TO THE CONCEPT OF CONTINUITY OF CZECHOSLOVAK HISTORY.

THE EFFORT SEEMS DESIGNED TO REINFORCE THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE REGIME BY ITS OWN POPULATION AND TO PROMOTE ITS IMAGE IN THE DIPLOMATIC ARENA. THE NEW STRESS ON LINKS WITH THE PAST MAY ALSO BE INTENDED TO COUNTER PRAGUE'S WELL-DESERVED REPUTATION FOR SUBSERVIENCE TO MOSCOW.

ACCORDING TO A FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL, PARTY

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CHIEF AND PRESIDENT HUSAK HAS THE HISTORICAL LINKAGE IN MIND WHEN HE RECENTLY INVITED FOREIGN AMBASSADORS AND CHIEFS OF MISSION TO THE FIRST PRESIDENTIAL HUNT IN ALMOST 30 YEARS. THIS TRADITIONAL EVENT OF THE OLD REPUBLIC WAS ABANDONED AFTER THE COMMUNISTS TOOK POWER IN 1948.⁴

FOREIGN MINISTER CHNOUPEK IS ALSO PROMOTING HIS-TORICAL CONTINUITY. IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY LAST MONTH, HE HARKED BACK TO THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC IN 1918 AND SEVERAL TIMES REFERRED TO CZECHOSLOVAK DIPLOMATIC "FIRSTS." HE ALSO DREDGED UP THE APPEAL OF MEDIEVAL BOHEMIAN KING GEORGE OF PODEROVY FOR AN INTEGRATED EUROPE.⁴

IN ADDITION, PREMIER STROUGAL, DURING HIS CURRENT TRIP TO YUGOSLAVIA, LAUDED THE SUPPORT OF THE YUGOSLAVS FOR THEIR CZECHOSLOVAK BRETHREN DURING THE 1938 MUNICH DIKTAT PERIOD.⁴

TO AVOID POSSIBLE CHARGES THAT THIS KIND OF

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STRESS ON PRE-COMMUNIST CZECHOSLOVAK HISTORY ENCOURAGES NATIONALISM. THE HUSAK REGIME HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO PAY PROPER OBEISANCE TO THE SOVIETS AND TO CONTINUE TO BE ONE OF THE MOST VOCIFEROUS PROPONENTS OF INTERNATIONALISM AND BLOC INTEGRATION. [CONFIDENTIAL]Y

5. USSR: DIPLOMATIC SOURCES HAVE CONFIRMED EARLIER REPORTS THAT FORMER DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER NIKOLAY PEGOV, 70, HAS BEEN APPOINTED CHIEF OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEPARTMENT FOR CADRES ABROAD. IN ADDITION, IZVESTIA ON DECEMBER 4 IDENTIFIED PEGOV AS "AMBASSADOR," NOT AS DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE CADRES ABROAD DEPARTMENT IS RARELY REFERRED TO BY NAME IN THE SOVIET PRESS.4

THE DEPARTMENT OVERSEES--FOR THE PARTY--THE ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL SERVING ABROAD. PEGOV AS A DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PERSONNEL MATTERS IN THE MFA.4

LEADERS OF THE DEPARTMENT IN THE PAST HAVE, LIKE

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PEGOV, HAD DIPLOMATIC EXPERIENCE. PETR ABRASIMOV, 63, WHO APPARENTLY HEADED THE DEPARTMENT FOR A TIME BETWEEN 1973 AND MARCH OF THIS YEAR, SERVED PREVIOUSLY AS AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE, EAST GERMANY, AND POLAND, AND IS CURRENTLY REASSIGNED TO EAST GERMANY. HIS PREDECESSOR, THE LATE ALEKSANDR PANYUSHKIN, HAD BEEN AMBASSADOR TO THE US AND CHINA, AND PANYUSHKIN'S FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF, ANDREY LEDOVSKY, HELD DIPLOMATIC ASSIGNMENTS IN THE FAR EAST FOR MANY YEARS. {CONFIDENTIAL}

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